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Behavioural economists from LSE and elsewhere have recently examined the ‘nudge’ research agenda and
its limits in a special journal issue. Here, Joan Costa-Font, David Just, Barbara Fasolo and Nick Powdthavee,
argue that, although appealing and policy relevant, more research is required.
Behavioural economics has passed the stage of having to convince other economists of its value. Today, it is a
branch of mainstream economics with a clear applied focus and obvious policy inclination. Economic analysis of
public policy, even when heavily theoretically based, no longer describes individuals as ‘rational optimisers’ who
seek to achieve fixed goals on the basis of motivations shaped by the social environment they are embedded in.
When economists talk of ‘incentives’, they are generally referring to mechanisms that prompt a desired behavioural
reaction. Hence, relevant microeconomics research should be first about understanding the motivations of
behaviour so that it can be translated into effective policy and regulation. This endeavour is far from trivial but only
recently has become a priority in economic research.
Governments are therefore beginning to recognise that they cannot look at individuals in a vacuum when designing
policy. On the contrary they need to identify cognitive and social constraints to behavior that are often group or
environment specific. Individual decisions can be more complex than they are portrayed by social planners, and
government interventions need to focus on modifying constraints to behaviour that limit individual choice.
In a recent special issue behavioural economists from LSE and elsewhere examined the question of ‘nudge’, the
idea of influencing people’s behaviour in positive directions, and its limits. Specifically, how to shape nudges
effectively for a specific context, whether the desired effects of these nudges can overcome potential side effects,
and the socio-economic and policy consequences of those nudges.
The question of how best to nudge a given behaviour is a complex one. To nudge individuals efficiently would
require a large amount of information about the constraints to behaviour, such as defaults, collectively set social
norms (which we refer here as ‘nudging ourselves’), and the ability to properly process risk information.
Moreover, by creating defaults that nudge individuals into certain courses of action, we have to account for how loss
averse individuals are, the goals individuals aspire to in public and private life, and, more generally, how effectively
individuals adjust their behaviour to meet their goals. Tweaking the options and information available to individuals
for paternalistic reasons is appealing but not the easiest endeavour. This explains why the ‘nudge’ research agenda,
although appealing and policy relevant, still calls for more research.
For instance, we know people save more in their pensions accounts, and are more likely to donate organs if they
are opted-in for organ donation as a default. But can we apply the same rationale to behaviours or choices that are
more complex than the dichotomous “donate or not donate” decision? Would innovation rates suffer if people were
constrained by defaults? There are numerous significant questions that emerge from the nudge literature that
deserve attention.
Some important evidence from the papers of the special issue suggests that policy intervention can be effective.
Specifically, it contributes to the debate on ‘nudge’ as a ‘soft paternalistic’ way of intervening in economic and social
life. Furthermore, it identifies some of the key behavioural mechanisms that influence food consumption and its
health-related consequences such as obesity. Health-related behaviour has to confront issues concerning the limits
of consumer sovereignty and need to explain where preferences come from, and whether we can do something to
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change them, in which case we should understand the ‘preference over preferences’.
Although the ‘nudge’ agenda is at the forefront of contemporary economic debate for good reason, it is not yet clear
that it can be applied in straightforward way in all circumstances. Hence, we would be ‘nudging ourselves’ if we were
to accept the ‘nudge agenda’ without further insights on its limits and side effects.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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